Taylor Pack Ellis, Best of Section A by Ellis, Taylor Pack
Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
First Year Best Briefs School of Law Student Scholarship
Spring 2012
Taylor Pack Ellis, Best of Section A
Taylor Pack Ellis
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.stmarytx.edu/bestbriefs
This Brief, Section A is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Student Scholarship at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University.
It has been accepted for inclusion in First Year Best Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more
information, please contact jlloyd@stmarytx.edu.
Recommended Citation









SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER TERM 2011 
------------- 





MURANO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
------------------------------------------- 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTIETH CIRCUIT 
------------------------------------------- 








TAYLOR A. PACK ELLIS 





I. Whether student speech outside the school setting is governed by Tinker v. Des Moines 
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MURANO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
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The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts  
have not been reported. The opinions appear in the record. 
v 
 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The court of appeals entered judgment on September 30, 2010. (R. at 20).  Petitioner filed 
his petition for writ of certiorari on December 30, 2010. ( R. at 21).  This Court granted the 
petition on June 7, 2011. (R. at 22).  This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 
(2000).  A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error.  Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 On September 14, 2009 Murano I High School (“Murano”) requested the removal of 
offensive content regarding school authorities from a Facebook group page created by Michael 
Fernando (“Fernando”) a few weeks prior. (R. at 6-7, 15).  When Fernando refused, Murano 
resorted to one of the few disciplinary measures available and suspend Fernando until he 
removed such content from the group page. (R. at 12).  The suspension was in direct reaction to 
the considerable disturbance the webpage cause at the school. (R. at 12).   
Fernando created the group page, called “Murano is Anti-Gay”, on his personal computer 
during out-of-school hours. (R. at 3).  He claimed he created the page to express his opinion 
about Murano Unified School District’s (“District”) hiring decisions and to provide a forum for 
other students to share their opinions. (R. at 6).  The Facebook group page quickly became 
popular among Murano students; the entire senior class joined the group and as well as students 
from the lower grades. (R. at 6).  Student members posted various comments, photographs, links 
and drawings to the group page. (R. at 4, 6, 12, 15).  Some of the most offensive content was 
posted by Fernando, which depicted school teachers and administrators in sexually explicit 
drawings. (R. at 15).  Although Fernando claims to have not intended the drawing to be shown at 
the campus and did not know who brought it to the school, the drawing did manifest on the 
school campus. (R. at 6).   
School authorities found Fernando’s offensive digital printout in a school classroom. (R. 
at 6).  This printout had been passed around during class and caused students to stop paying 
attention to their lessons. (R. at 15).  Students frequently referenced the posted drawings, 
comments, and links during class; and as a result, teachers reported having greater difficulty with 





students frequently accessed Facebook on school computers, personal laptops, and mobile 
phones while they were in school. (R. at 2).  Murano subsequently instituted website blocking 
software on school computers to minimize access to Facebook from the school campus. (R. at 
10).  Additionally, many students and parents complained to the school regarding the website’s 
increasingly offensive and sexually explicit content. (R. at 2, 15).  Some parents even threatened 
to remove their children from Murano because of the problems the group page has caused. (R. at 
14).     
Teachers and administrators continued to be offended and ridiculed by their students for 
over a month, which inevitably affected instruction. (R. at 14).  Students were constantly 
distracted by Fernando’s inappropriate posts and some students banded together to oppose any 
and all disciplinary measures imposed by Murano. (R. at 14).  As the district court found, 
Fernando’s student expression had a serious disruptive effect on the school environment, 
affecting teachers, administrators, students, and the community at large (R. at 17). 
On October 17, 2009, Petitioner, Fernando, filed a motion for preliminary injunction to 
enjoin the District from continuing his suspension with the District Court for the Southern 
District of Lovelystate. (R. at 6, 11).  In denying Petitioner’s motion, the court held that the 
school speech cases, specifically Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
applied to both on-campus and off-campus student expression because the relevant question is 
the effect on the school, not the location of the speech.  (R. at 16-17).  Applying the test from 
Tinker, the court found evidence of serious disruption of the school environment. (R. at 17).  The 
Court of Appeals for the Fiftieth Circuit affirmed what it called the “thorough and well-reasoned 
opinion of the court below.” (R. at 20).  On December 30, 2010, Fernando filed a Writ of 





SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
This Court has interpreted the First Amendment guarantee of free speech to provide for 
regulation in certain circumstances.  Speech related to the school setting is certainly one of the 
circumstances.  The rights of students to speak freely must be balanced against society’s interest 
in education and socially appropriate behavior.   
Schools may regulate student speech in spite of its original creation off-campus, when the 
speech has a sufficient nexus to the school.  The essence of the issue is the effect the speech has 
on the school, not the location where it took place.  The requisite nexus may be forged when the 
student’s speech was carried onto campus by the student himself or by a fellow classmate, was 
accessed at the school by the student or other students, or if it was directed at persons in school 
and/or acted on by them. 
Fernando’s conduct clearly created the required nexus to the school campus to support 
regulation pursuant to the Tinker standard.  His expression was physically manifested on the 
school’s campus through a digital printout and through students accessing the site at school and 
on school computers.  This literally brought the speech on-campus and forged the required 
nexus.  Additionally, Fernando’s speech was directed at the school and its student body which 
also establishes the required nexus.  Thus, a sufficient nexus between Fernando’s speech and the 
school existed to allow for its regulation as school speech.  
II. 
The Murano Unified School District was justified in regulating Fernando’s speech 
pursuant to Tinker and its progeny because it created a substantial disruption at the school and 





when school authorities demonstrate the behavior actually caused material disruption of 
classwork, substantial disorder, invasion of the rights of others, or that it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the behavior would cause such results.   
Fernando’s speech clearly caused a substantial disruption at the school.  His expression 
caused classroom disruption by increasing teacher’s difficulty with discipline and instruction 
during class time.  School disorder was evident through the adverse effects on all elements of the 
school community; students, teachers and parents were very upset, school officials were kept 
from their other necessary functions, and additional school resources were required to address 
access to the speech at school. The weight of this evidence only further supported by the fact that 
such disruption need only be reasonably foreseeable by school officials.  Thus, Murano had the 
authority to regulate Fernando’s speech. 
Fernando’s speech may also be regulated pursuant to Tinker’s progeny, specifically under 
the lewd and vulgar exception to First Amendment rights at the school.  Following Tinker, this 
Court held that a school need not tolerate a student’s nominating speech given in front of a 
school audience that contained sexually offensive innuendo.  Thus, school authorities have the 
ability to regulate and punish lewd and vulgar speech because it is inappropriate for the school 
setting.  Since Fernando’s speech is sufficiently tied to the school it may be appropriately 
regulated under this standard because it included sexually explicit content.   
ARGUMENT 
 
I. STUDENT SPEECH WHICH ORIGINATED OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL SETTING IS 
PROPERLY GOVERNED BY TINKER WHEN THAT SPEECH HAS A SUFFICIENT 
NEXUS TO THE SCHOOL. 
 
The constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive 





(1986).  The Constitution provides that Congress shall not abridge the right to free speech.  U.S. 
Const. amend. I.  However, this Court has interpreted this First Amendment right to permit 
reasonable regulation of speech in certain circumstances.  Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, 393 U.S. 504, 513 (1969).  The freedom to express unpopular and 
controversial viewpoints must be balanced against society’s interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.  Importantly, schools have 
the comprehensive authority to prescribe and control conduct in the schools, within 
constitutional limits.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.  This authority extends to student conduct in and 
out of the classroom.  Id.  at 513.   
Specifically, student speech originating off-campus is properly governed by the Tinker 
standard when it has created a sufficient nexus with the school.  E.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. 
Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Jan. 17,  2012) 
(No. 11–461) (finding a sufficient nexus existed between student’s website created off-campus 
and the school’s pedagogical concerns); Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 
F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding a sufficient nexus existed between the student’s article 
created off-campus and the school when it was distributed on-campus by another student); J.S. ex 
rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (finding a sufficient nexus 
existed between student’s website and school campus to consider the speech as occurring on-
campus). But see, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012) (No. 11-502) (assuming 
without deciding that the Tinker test applies to website speech harassing a school administrator).   
The heart of the issue is the effect that speech has on the school, not the metaphysical 





interfered with the school’s legitimate interest in maintaining order in the school and protecting 
the well-being and educational rights of its students.  Id.  at 572.  This notion supports extension 
of school authority over off-campus speech when that speech affects the school.  See Id.  at 573. 
The required nexus may be forged when the student’s speech reaches the school in a 
meaningful way.  Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574.  This may occur when the speech is carried onto 
campus by the student himself or by a fellow classmate.  Boucher, 134 F.3d at 829.  Internet 
speech may reach the school when the student who created the speech or other students access 
the website while on the school’s campus.  Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 
1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998).  See also Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 865 (finding the student 
facilitated the on-campus nature of the speech by accessing the website on a school computer in 
a classroom and showing it to other students).  However, the temporal relation of the speech to 
the school may be too attenuated to provide for regulation.  Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 
393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062 (2005) (finding a student drawing 
created two years prior to its being brought to campus did not create the necessary nexus because 
it was too removed from the school in time).   
Additionally, a court could allow regulation of off-campus speech if it determined the 
speech was directed at, received by, and/or acted upon by persons in the school.  Kowalski, 652 
F.3d. at 573.  Especially significant are facts tending to show that the speech was targeted at the 
school, its students, or its personnel, making it inevitable that the speech would reach the school 
grounds.  See e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 348 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3065 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2011) (No. 11-113) (allowing regulation of student speech where 
the student’s blog post directly pertained to a school event and encouraged other students to 





494 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 296 (2008) (finding it foreseeable that 
student’s off-campus IM would come to the school when the targeted audience comprised fellow 
students); Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 865 (finding the student website was aimed at the specific 
audience of other students and school district community members, which brought it within the 
school’s authority to regulate). 
Applying the school speech jurisprudence, Fernando’s expression clearly created the 
required nexus to the school campus to be regulated pursuant to the Tinker standard.  See Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 513.  The physical manifestation of Fernando’s speech on-campus created a 
sufficient nexus with the school.  See Boucher, 134 F.3d at 829.  Even though Fernando did not 
bring the printout to the school himself, its physical presence at the school supports creation of 
the required nexus.  See Id.  Furthermore, students had access and did access the webpage from 
the school campus.  Such actions clearly brought the speech onto the school’s campus and 
established the nexus between the speech and the school.  See Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.  
There is no implication that the span of time between Fernando’s creation of the speech and its 
manifestation on-campus was too attenuated to allow for regulation, as only two weeks had 
passed.  See Porter, 393 F.3d at 615. 
In addition, Fernando’s speech was directed at the school, the school administration, and 
the school’s students, thus making it on-campus speech.  See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 348.  All 
members of the page were other Murano students.  The topic of the page was regarding the 
school’s hiring practices and displeasure with school administrators and teachers.  Given that the 
audience compromised students and that the topic of the page was the school district, it was 





Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573.  It was also reasonably foreseeable that it would come to the attention 
of school authorities.  Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39-40. 
Thus, the District was justified in regulating Fernando’s off-campus speech pursuant to 
Tinker because it established a sufficient nexus to the school to be considered on-campus speech.  
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
II. THE MURANO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS JUSTIFIED IN 
REGULATING FERNANDO’S SPEECH PURSUANT TO TINKER AND ITS 
PROGENY BECAUSE IT CREATED A SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION AT THE 
SCHOOL AND INCLUDED LEWD AND VULGAR CONTENT. 
 
A. Tinker’s requirement of a substantial disruption is satisfied when school 
authorities demonstrate the behavior actually caused material disruption of 
classwork, substantial disorder, invasion of the rights of others, or that it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the behavior would cause such results. 
 
The standard set forth in Tinker requires that the student’s speech materially and 
substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school.  Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 504, 509 
(1969).  This Court defines this requirement satisfied by conduct which materially disrupts 
classwork, involves substantial disorder, or invades the rights of others.  Id.  at 513.  An 
undifferentiated fear of disturbance is not enough to warrant interference with freedom of 
expression.  Id.  at 509.  However, if the school can reasonably forecast the speech to be 
substantially disruptive or to create material interference with school activities, it would be 
justified in regulating such speech.  Id.  at 514.  This Court also holds that in order to justify 
regulation of speech, the school must also show it was more than a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that generally accompanies an unpopular viewpoint.  Id.  at 509.  
See also Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) 





upon seeing speech he characterized as upsetting instead of acting upon any actual or reasonable 
fear of substantial disruption). 
The speech in Tinker involved students wearing black arm bands to school in protest of 
the United States participation in the Vietnam War.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.  There was no 
indication from the record that the work of the school or any class was disrupted due to this 
expression.  Id.  at 508.  There were a few students who made hostile remarks to the students 
wearing arm bands but there were no threats of violence on the school campus.  Id.  This Court 
concluded that the school appeared to regulate this speech because it wished to avoid controversy 
regarding the Vietnam War.  Id.  at 510.  All together there was insufficient evidence that a 
substantial disruption occurred at the school to justify the school’s regulation of Tinker’s speech.  
Id.  at 514. 
Several courts have illustrated what will constitute a substantial disruption of classwork.  
Such a disruption could be caused by students passing around, reading, and reacting to another 
student’s speech.  Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Minn. 1987), aff'd., 
855 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1988).  This activity could cause a teacher to have diminished control of 
his or her classroom or would interfere with instruction and study.  C.f. Killion v. Franklin Reg'l 
Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (citing cases of sufficient classroom 
disruption but finding no evidence that teachers were incapable of teaching or controlling their 
class).  General ramblings in class that only last for a few minutes, when the teacher is able to 
regain control of the classroom quickly, will not qualify as substantial disruption.  J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 929 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 80 





significant.  See Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 674 (showing a classroom was affected in the long-term 
when the teacher stopped teaching a class and was replaced by a substitute teacher).   
Similarly, other courts have illustrated what will constitute substantial disorder in the 
school.  Creating low student morale, student anxiety, or upsetting students qualifies as a 
substantial disorder in the school.  J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 
869 (Pa. 2002).  Disorder is evident when school authorities encounter serious interference with 
their required duties.  Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 349 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3065 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2011) (No. 11-113) (student blog post encouraging others to 
contact school authorities caused a large amount of phone calls and emails to the principal).  
However, only needing to rearrange schedules to deal with problems surrounding student speech 
will not interfere with school administrator’s required function enough to sustain regulating the 
student’s speech.  Snyder, 650 F.3d at 929.  There is also support for regulating speech when 
there was evidence that school resources were diverted to address the problems created by the 
student speech.  Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 
1998) (where the school’s computer administrators had to diagnose system weaknesses and 
change computer passwords).  In its broadest form, substantial disorder not only affects teachers, 
students, and school officials, but can also affect parents, evident when they contact the school to 
express great concern for their children’s wellbeing and continued instruction as a result of 
student speech.  Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 869. 
Disorder is also possible whenever student speech is aimed at harassment and bullying, 
since it is an essential function of the school to prevent such behavior.  Kowalski v. Berkeley 
Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Jan. 17,  





with the rights of others, which is also a Tinker criterion for regulation.  Id.  at 547.  However, 
the relevant issue of Fernando’s speech and Murano’s regulation is the substantial disruption and 
disorder his speech caused at the school. 
All of these illustrations consist of evidence of disruption that has actually occurred on-
campus.  However, a school need not wait for actual disruption to occur for it to be justified in 
regulating speech if it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will cause disruption.  Snyder, 
650 F.3d at 928.  A school is justified in controlling speech when it reasonably believes that the 
speech would cause disruption at the school if left unregulated.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.  The 
court in Doninger found it reasonably foreseeable that substantial disruption would stem from an 
inciting and misleading blog post regarding a school activity.  Doninger, 642 F.3d at 349.  
Another court found it reasonably foreseeable that an IM icon depicting violence against a 
teacher would cause substantial disruption.  Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 296 (2008).  Similarly, the 
Boucher court found it reasonably foreseeable that disruption due to possible interference with 
school computers and networks could be substantial.  Boucher, 134 F.3d at 827.  However, such 
predictions should not be based on prior similar acts, especially when such prior acts never 
caused disruption.  Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455. 
There is ample evidence illustrating the substantial disruption Fernando’s speech caused 
at the school campus.  Fernando’s expression created substantial interference with classwork.  
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.  Teachers had greater difficulty in maintaining control and 
discipline in their classrooms because students were constantly distracted by talk about the posts 
from Fernando’s webpage; this interfered with instruction and learning.  See Bystrom, 686 F. 





with some Murano teachers continuing to have trouble maintaining classroom decorum.  See 
Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 674 
Fernando’s speech also caused substantial disorder in the school.  See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
513.  Students have complained to the school regarding the increasingly offensive and vulgar 
content of the webpage indicating their distress over the speech.  See Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 
869.  School administrators have been pulled away from their work to deal with the influx of 
complaints over Fernando’s webpage and disciplinary problems stemming from it.  See 
Doninger, 642 F.3d at 349.  Additionally, school resources were diverted to implement computer 
software to block Facebook access at the school.  See Boucher, 134 F.3d at 827.  And most 
broadly, parents, encompassing an essential component or the school community, were upset and 
concerned over the effect the website was having on the school.  See Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 
869. 
The weight of the evidence regarding substantial disruption of classwork and substantial 
disorder at the school in Fernando’s case is in stark contrast to the de minimus disruption of cases 
where the student’s speech was protected.  See e.g., Snyder, 650 F.3d at 929 (minimal disruption 
caused by general student ramblings; only a few minutes were lost on class discipline because 
teachers were easily able to regain control of class; teachers only had to rearrange their schedules 
to address issues caused by the speech); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (teachers were not 
incapable of teaching or controlling their classes); Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1178–79 (no 
disruption caused by viewing the site at the school campus and minimal disruption caused by 
delivery of disciplinary notice to the offending student). 
Furthermore, when a reasonably foreseeable fear of disruption would suffice to regulate 





See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.  Surely, Murano could have reasonably believed that a foreseeable 
substantial disruption would occur at the school campus because of Fernando’s offensive and 
inciting speech.  See e.g., Doninger, 642 F.3d at 349; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d 34, 39–40; Boucher, 
134 F.3d at 827.  Thus, there is abundant evidence of actual substantial disruption and reasonably 
foreseeable substantial disruption caused at the school by Fernando’s speech which justified 
Murano’s regulation of that speech.  See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
B. Fernando’s speech may also be regulated pursuant to Tinker’s progeny, 
specifically under the exception to First Amendment rights at the school for 
speech that is lewd and vulgar. 
 
Following Tinker, this Court found acceptable regulation of student speech which did not 
involve substantial disruption in three instances.  The first exception to the application of Tinker 
to school speech involved offensively lewd and indecent speech that took place at the school 
campus.  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).  In Fraser, a student 
used sexual innuendo in a student government nomination speech which he delivered to the 
student body during a school-sponsored assembly.  Id.  at 677–78.  This Court stated that the 
right to freedom of speech and expression in the school must be balanced against the interest of 
schools in teaching its students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.  Id.  at 681.  It is 
an appropriate function of public schools to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language 
because it relates to the schools interest in educating its students on the proper modes of 
discourse and mature conduct in civilized society.  Id.  at 683.  Furthermore, the determination of 
what language is inappropriate for the classroom and other school-related activities properly rests 
with the school board.  Id.  This Court later refined its holding from Fraser by stating that had 
the student delivered the speech outside the school, the speech could not have been properly 





This Court’s next major exception to Tinker involved regulation of student speech that 
could be construed as having the school’s endorsement.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988).  This Court evaluated the constitutionality of a school regulating the 
content of a student-produced, school-sponsored newspaper.  Id.  at 260.  It decided that the First 
Amendment is not violated by school authorities exercising control over student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities, as long as the regulation is reasonably related to 
pedagogical concerns.  Id.  at 273.   
Most recently, this Court held that schools may control speech at school related activities 
that can reasonably be construed to promote illegal drugs.  Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.  The case 
arose from a group of students displaying a banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” while at a 
school sanctioned event taking place both in front of and across the street from the school 
campus.  Id. 
It is sufficiently established that Fernando’s expression can be considered on-campus 
speech because it physically made its way to the school campus and was directed at the school 
and its community.  See e.g., Doninger, 642 F.3d at 348; Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573; Bethlehem, 
807 A.2d at 865.  Therefore, it can also be regulated pursuant to Fraser regardless of where it 
occurred.  See Morse, 551 U.S. 397.  Compare Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (not applying Fraser 
because regulation under Tinker was satisfied, but noting that the speech could have been 
regulated under Fraser because the originally off-campus speech was determined to be on-
campus speech and contained sexual lewd content), and Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 673–74. 
(applying Tinker and Fraser to student website because the speech contained lewd, vulgar and 
offensive content regarding school teachers and authorities), with Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. 





2012) (No. 11-502) (only allowing application of Fraser for originally off-campus speech where 
there is also evidence of a substantial disruption on-campus due to the speech), and Snyder, 650 
F.3d 932 (holding Fraser not applicable where student speech is brought to campus at the 
request of school officials or where it is not physically brought to campus at all other than by 
word of mouth). 
Fernando’s expression, the digital printout found on-campus, was of a vulgar and lewd 
nature, depicting school officials in a sexually explicit manner.  Certainly this is the type of 
vulgar and offensive speech a school need not tolerate and would be justified in regulating to 
protect its student body from such expression.  See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.  There should be no 
impediment to apply Fraser to Fernando’s speech for lack of a substantial disruption as such a 
disturbance is evidenced above.  See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219.  Nor should application be 
barred for an insufficient relationship between Fernando’s speech and the school; it was not 
brought on-campus at the request of a school authority and it was not merely a verbal recount but 
an actual physical manifestation.  See Snyder, 650 F.3d 932.  Fernando’s was no less offensively 
lewd or vulgar than Fraser’s.  See Fraser, 578 U.S. at 687.  Whereas Fraser used sexual innuendo 
verbally, Fernando’s digital drawing was sexually explicit and viewable, making it that much 
more offensive.  See Id.   
  Neither Kuhlmeier nor Morse are controlling because it is clear that Fernando’s speech 
could not be construed as being endorsed by the school nor did it involve promoting illegal 
drugs.  See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270–71; See Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.  However, Fernando’s 
expression was of an offensively lewd and vulgar nature bringing it within the category of 







 Respondent respectfully requests this Court affirm the Fiftieth Circuit’s decision and find 
that the Murano Unified School District was justified in regulating Petitioner’s speech.  This 
Court should find that a sufficient nexus was established between Fernando’s speech and the 
school to bring it within school speech jurisprudence.   In doing so, this Court will uphold the 
compelling interest schools have in maintaining instruction, discipline and decorum on their 
campuses.  In applying the Tinker and Fraser standards to Fernando’s speech, this Court should 
find that it qualifies for regulation under these guidelines because it caused a substantial 
disruption at the school and contained offensively lewd and vulgar content.  Rejecting 
Petitioner’s argument that his speech was insufficiently related to the school and furthermore 
failed to cause the required disruption will solidify the current jurisprudence regarding school 
related speech. 
PRAYER 
For these reasons, Respondent prays this Court affirm the decision of the court below. 
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